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I. Executive Summary 
 
Ohio faces significant challenges to its 
manufacturing in a global economy.  
Energy-intensive manufacturing, in 
particular, is threatened by rising 
electricity costs and a need to reduce 
carbon emissions.  Electricity costs are 
projected to increase substantially in the 
coming years, especially in grid-
constrained areas such as that found in 
Northern Ohio.  Northern Ohio’s Regional 
Transmission Organization (RTO) 
generation capacity charges are 
scheduled to go up by over 1400% in the 
next few years, rendering RTO capacity 
charges the second highest cost 
component to electricity, after the 
wholesale cost of electricity.  In addition 
to this, Ohio manufacturers are incurring 
new costs meeting Environmental 
Protection Agency guidelines for steam 
and heat generation.  Together, these 
forces have created a significant threat to 
Ohio manufacturing. 
 
One answer to this threat is the adoption 
of distributed generation, especially in the 
form of combined heat and power, or 
CHP.  Distributed generation is power 
generated in small amounts at or near the 
site of consumption, thereby reducing line 
losses and increasing the strategic value 
of that power.  CHP offers the best near 
term solution for manufacturing, insofar 
as it is reliable and it enables the 
manufacturer to reduce its reliance on the 
grid.  CHP can provide a solution to both 
the problem of rising capacity charges 
and to meeting the EPA requirements for 
steam generation.  It may also be a 
solution for rising distribution charges, 
including those associated with the cost 
of meeting energy efficiency and 
renewable generation mandates.  
However before CHP can be more fully 
adopted by manufacturing, regulatory 
impediments to its adoption must be 
addressed.  The two major regulatory 
impediments relate to standby charges 
and to a lack of a market for surplus 
power that values its strategic location 
near other markets.  If regulators do not 
recognize the value CHP can bring to 
ratepayers system-wide, standby fees are 
likely to render a CHP project 
uneconomic.  In Ohio, policy makers 
sought to enable the adoption for CHP by 
passing legislation that qualified CHP as 
responsive to the State’s energy efficiency 
mandate, but failed to provide a 
meaningful mechanism for those 
deploying CHP to realize value from this. 
 
Policy makers should look at other 
impediments and/or enabling strategies 
for the adoption of CHP.  Public support 
for financing CHP is currently available, 
including loans and tax incentives, but 
many manufacturers have a difficult time 
justifying the long-term investment 
required for most CHP projects.  
Strategies that mitigate the risk of 
stranded assets, such as the use of 
modular designs that enable easier 
recovery of key assets, might make for 
shorter and less risky third party 
financing agreements. 
 
Other strategies that policy makers can 
deploy to encourage CHP include the 
decoupling of sales from utility profits, 
the development of self-generation 
investment portfolios, regulations that 
enable the advent of micro-grids, and 
regional energy planning that helps 
manufacturers identify opportunities for 
district heating and micro-grids.  
Center for Economic Development, Cleveland State University Page 3 
Ohio manufacturers face multiple threats 
for which distributed generation and CHP 
could provide relief.   However these 
threats also create an opportunity for 
manufacturers to position themselves to 
have a long-term competitive advantage 
over other manufacturers, especially 
those in Asia and Europe, who do not 
enjoy inexpensive natural gas like Ohio 
does.  The advent of shale gas, which has 
created a promising long-term outlook for 
natural gas prices, may make the case for 
CHP even more compelling.  However 
Ohio policy makers must ensure that 
Ohio’s regulations support and do not 
impede the deployment of distributed 
generation in Ohio, especially for CHP.   
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II.   Background and Introduction 
 
Manufacturing is an energy-intensive 
business. Manufacturers account for 
roughly one half of America’s natural gas 
and 30% of its electricity consumption.1  
Accordingly, a secure, reliable and 
affordable source of electricity is a top 
priority for Ohio’s manufacturers.  Those 
manufacturers for which electricity costs 
make up an especially significant portion of 
their product costs are most vulnerable to 
rapid rate increases.2   The decline in 
manufacturing jobs throughout America has 
accelerated in recent years.   Ohio has lost 
some 117,000 manufacturing jobs in the 
last five years alone – the second highest 
total in America.3  Policy affecting energy 
costs is critical to Ohio manufacturing 
maintaining a competitive position in the 
global economy. 
Electricity-intensive industries comprise a 
major part of Ohio’s manufacturing 
landscape.   In particular, manufacturers of 
chemicals, metal products and glass are 
significant employers in Ohio and are 
electricity-intensive businesses.   Aluminum 
manufacturing leads the way, with 5.7% of 
its expenditures on electricity.  The iron and 
steel, chemical, glass and foundry 
manufacturing follow, each with a 2.3% or 
greater portion of its expenses made on the 
                                                        
1
 “Retooling Ohio:  A Bulletin for Leaders on Policy 
Issues Critical to Ohio Manufacturers,” 
www.ohiomfg.com (Ohio Manufacturer’s 
Association 2010).  
2
 Id. at 2-3.  
3
 S. Thomas, “Long Term Manufacturing Losses 
Affect All States,” The Business Journal (July 11, 
2012); http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/on-
numbers/scott-thomas/2012/07/longterm-
manufacturing-decline-affects.html?page=2. 
acquisition of electricity.   In terms of total 
dollars spent, chemical manufacturing leads 
the state, with expenditures of over $352 
million per year on electricity.  Iron and 
Steel industries, at $305 million, and 
Aluminum at $244 million per year, are 
next.  These industries all employ many 
thousands in Ohio, and are highly sensitive 
to increases in electricity costs.4     
Manufacturers are also facing multiple 
forces that are driving them toward a new 
energy paradigm:  the shift from centralized 
to distributed generation.  These forces 
include rising electricity costs due to 
transmission and generation capacity 
constraint, new EPA standards for coal fired 
steam and electricity generation, and a 
natural gas surplus that has made gas-fired 
distributed generation technologies such as 
combined heat and power more 
economical. This natural gas surplus stands 
in stark contrast to the situation in Europe 
and Asia, where natural gas prices are 
multiples of the cost of gas in America – 
promising a potential competitive 
advantage for energy intensive 
manufacturing in Ohio and elsewhere in 
America. Accordingly, manufacturers are 
now looking more closely than ever at 
distributed generation.   
This study is intended to provide 
manufacturers with insights as to policies 
that may affect their ability to deploy 
distributed generation to reduce their cost 
                                                        
4
 I. Lendel, et al, “Moving Ohio Manufacturing 
Forward:  Competitive Electricity Pricing,” the Urban 
Center, Levin College, Cleveland State University 
(February 2013).    
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of electricity, and to provide ideas or 
strategies for manufacturers to consider for 
deploying distributed generation.  In 
addition, this study is intended to help 
inform policy makers as they consider what 
can and should be done in Ohio to 
encourage distributed generation. A 
separate and companion study also includes 
an analysis of how changes in electricity 
pricing can affect manufacturing 
productivity.5 
                                                        
5 Id.  
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A.  The Role of Deregulation in Electricity Pricing. 
 
Not surprisingly, given the above statistics, 
it has been energy intensive manufacturers 
in Ohio and elsewhere that have 
championed electricity policy reform in 
America over the past thirty years.  
Manufacturing has been successful in this 
endeavor – leading to what one energy 
writer called the “Quiet Revolution”:  
governments around the world are 
liberalizing their energy markets, opening 
up their borders to energy markets for 
natural gas and electricity.6   This 
“revolution” was originally instigated by 
energy-intensive industries seeking to open 
up electricity and natural gas markets in 
America.  The industries were motivated in 
part by the energy shocks of the 1970’s and 
the resulting legislation:  the National Gas 
Policy Act (NGPA) and the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA).7  Both acts 
were passed to deal with the energy crisis 
that had gripped the nation and had 
catalyzed the onset of the “rust belt” in the 
Great Lakes region.  The NGPA froze “old” 
gas sold on the interstate market at 
unsustainable prices, but rewarded 
producing companies who drilled for new 
natural gas production with market prices, 
thereby eventually alleviating the natural 
gas crisis.   PURPA, however, was less 
successful in resolving electricity problems.  
Its goal was resolve electricity shortfalls by 
encouraging conservation and mandating 
that utilities purchase power from 
independent wholesale power producers.   
                                                        
6
 V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People: How the 
Coming Energy Revolution Will Transform an 
Industry, Change Our Lives and Maybe Save the 
Planet, at 18 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2003). 
7
 Public Utilities Regulatory Act, Pub.L. No. 95-617, 
92 Stat. 3117 (1978); Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub.L. 
No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).   
However the existing regulatory framework 
caused electricity prices to continue to rise 
even as new generation was brought on 
line.   
Under PURPA the individual states were to 
encourage new generation from small 
(below 80 MW) facilities that used 
something other than fossil fuels, or used 
waste heat, by requiring utilities to 
purchase power there from at its “avoided 
cost” – the cost the utility would have had 
to pay if it had built new, centralized 
electricity generation of a like amount.  But 
avoided costs were not based on market 
prices; there was no wholesale market for 
electricity at the time.  Instead, prices were 
based upon “but for” forecasts, and 
regulators soon found that electricity prices 
had no relation to market realities.   
Independent power producers had no 
incentive to innovate or to provide 
electricity at a lower cost.8   
For decades in America, electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution 
were all regulated, with utilities enjoying 
“cost plus” rate recovery for nearly all of 
their expenditures, regardless of their folly.   
The cost-plus strategy invited not only 
technology stagnation, but also bloated 
utility budgets, since there was no incentive 
to constrain costs.   Inevitably, rates soared 
under this paradigm; average electricity 
rates in America rose 60% between 1969 
and 1984, adjusted for inflation.9  The 
biggest culprit for this problem lay with 
massive cost overruns associated with the 
                                                        
8
 J. Lesser and L. Giacchino, Fundamentals of Energy 
Regulation, 9-11 (Public Utilities Reports 2007).  
9
 Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 31. 
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building of large centralized nuclear 
generation plants.    
By the 1990’s a wholesale electricity market 
was beginning to develop (partly in 
response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992).  
Further, due to a sluggish economy, 
demand for electricity was stagnant, and a 
surplus capacity developed.   Yet power 
costs remained high due to the massive cost 
overruns and the cost-plus regulatory 
recovery schemes.   Residential and 
commercial end users, with little voice for 
advocacy at the time, could do little about 
this.   Energy intensive industrial users, on 
the other hand, had the wherewithal to 
influence energy policy in the United States.   
As a result, manufacturers, along with other 
large users of power, began to coordinate 
efforts to lobby for the right to bypass 
utilities and to take their loads to an open 
wholesale generation market.   As a result, 
in 1994 deregulation was first introduced to 
America through sweeping regulatory 
reform in California.10    Deregulation 
thereafter spread throughout the nation, 
and continues to develop to this day.   
California, predictably, also was the source 
of the first major problems with 
deregulation.   First out of the gate, 
California took some serious missteps, the 
most problematic being that it only partially 
opened up its electricity markets.  
California’s public service administrators 
froze retail electric rates -- at a time when 
power generation there was already in a 
tight market -- thereby creating no 
incentive for consumers to cut back usage.  
Then, in the face of this tight power supply, 
California officials adopted what has since 
been described as the “BANANAS”   (Build 
                                                        
10
 Lesser, Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, at 10.  
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near 
Anybody) strategy:  a combination of 
uncertainty, tough environmental laws and 
politics discouraged new generation from 
being built.   On top of this, wholesalers like 
Enron found ways to rig the markets.  The 
result was that wholesale prices shot up, 
retail prices remained frozen, and utilities 
fell into financial disarray, with two utilities 
pushed to the point of insolvency.11  A 
backlash to deregulation began to occur in 
that state, led by the long, hot summer of 
2000 when electricity prices skyrocketed 
and blackouts became commonplace.   
None of the promised cost reductions had 
materialized.  By 2001 calls for “re-
regulation” began to be heard.  
In 1999, before the California problems 
emerged, Ohio took its first steps towards 
deregulation with the enactment of Senate 
Bill 3 in 1999.   At the time, electricity prices 
varied dramatically between northern and 
southern Ohio; southern Ohio enjoyed coal 
generation and lower rates, while northern 
Ohio used a mixture of coal and the more 
expensive nuclear power.12  The result was 
that manufacturers and consumer groups 
lobbied the Ohio legislature to open up the 
state’s electricity markets.   Ultimately, 
however, a competitive market for 
electricity failed to fully materialize.  Many 
argued that too many concessions to the 
utilities had discouraged, rather than 
encouraged, competition.  The result was 
the 2008 partial “re-regulation” of the 
                                                        
11
 Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 74-82.   
12
 See e.g. D. Gearino, Former PUCO Officials and 
Legislatures Say State Regulatory Process Favors 
Utilities Over Customers in Setting Rates, The 
Columbus Dispatch, Dec. 18, 2011, at 1A.   
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electricity industry through Senate Bill 
221.13 
It remains to be seen how successful 
deregulation will be in creating an open 
market for wholesale electricity in Ohio and 
elsewhere.  Wholesale electricity prices 
have dropped significantly since 2008, but 
this appears to be more related to the deep 
recession than to a more robust wholesale 
market.  Further, the evidence of the effects 
of deregulation has been obscured by the 
fact that only those states where electricity 
prices were high chose to deregulate.  So 
while it may appear that electricity price 
increases have slowed in the deregulated 
states as a result of deregulation, the fact 
remains that those states that restructured 
their markets continue to have electricity 
prices that are substantially higher than 
those who did not – and that gap has 
actually grown, not gotten smaller, since 
deregulation began in the late 1990’s.14 
One significant reason why deregulation 
has failed to fully develop a fully 
unencumbered wholesale market is that 
this markets remains captured by regional 
transmission organization (“RTO”) capacity 
charges.  “Capacity” in this sense refers to 
the amount of electricity locally available to 
be delivered when demand on the grid is at 
its peak – typically in late afternoons in high 
summer.  Because transmission is tied so 
closely to generation, generation does not 
enjoy a completely free market.  High RTO 
capacity charges commonly result when 
constrained transmission combines with 
                                                        
13
 Id. 
14 Retail Electric Rates in Deregulated and 
Regulated States: 2011 Update, American Public 
Power Association, April 2012, 
http://publicpower.org/files/PDFs/RKW_Final_-
_2011_update.pdf 
insufficient local generation. Since this 
power supply is essentially on standby, 
awaiting peak system wide requirements, it 
tends to use the most expensive – and most 
profitable – energy generation technology. 
Nowhere is the problem of capacity costs 
more evident than in Northern Ohio’s First 
Energy-Ohio region, known as “American 
Transmissions Systems, Inc., or ATSI.”  In 
May 2012 First Energy’s RTO, PJM, held a 
capacity auction that resulted in RTO 
capacity costs for the ATSI region that were 
three times higher than the rest of the PJM 
territory.  While the resulting costs 
consumers bear will depend upon the 
coincidence of their peak demand with 
system wide peak demand, the average 
capacity costs in northern Ohio will increase 
by 1700% by 2015 – ultimately becoming 
the second largest component of electricity 
prices for most customers, and for some, 
the highest.15  
In theory, high capacity charges should lead 
to the building of new generation.  But 
there is not always a direct relationship 
between short-term price signals and the 
building out of long-term capacity.16 Under 
Ohio regulations, for instance, the utilities 
will prefer to build new grid in response to 
grid congestion rather than to build new 
generation capacity, since a return is 
guaranteed on the grid investment, but not 
                                                        
15 M. Brakey, “Skyrocketing First Energy-Ohio 
Capacity Costs,” at 1 (September 2012).  See 
http://www.brakeyenergy.com/white-papers-
special-reports/ 
16 See e.g. R. Michaels, “MW Gamble:  The Missing 
Market for Capacity,” The Electricity Journal, at 56-
64 (December 1997) (“Reluctance to commit to 
generation in anticipation of markets may indicate 
that we have not thought through the 
consequences of the institutions we are putting in 
place.) 
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the generation.  Indeed, it has been shown 
in Europe, where generation has also been 
deregulated, that short term price signals 
sent by high capacity charges do exactly the 
opposite:  they induce utilities to under 
invest in aggregate capacity, and to 
profitably distort the technology mix 
towards peaking units.17  It may prove more 
profitable in Ohio for utilities to maintain 
capacity constraint and to continue to tack 
large peaking unit capacity charges onto 
wholesale power prices. In short, utilities 
strategically limit their investment into local 
generation to maintain higher prices.18 
Other problems with deregulation, such as 
incomplete open access to transmission 
lines, remain to be resolved.  However the 
biggest current threat to deregulation, and 
to Ohio manufacturers, is the capacity 
charge problem.  All of this is outside the 
scope of the Public Utility Commission of 
Ohio (PUCO) to control.  That said, 
however, the threat of rising capacity 
charges can be mitigated in principal part 
through self-generation.  This will require a 
regulatory scheme in Ohio that is friendly to 
distributed generation.  
                                                        
17 See G. Meunier, “Capacity Choice, Technology 
Mix and Market Power,” 32 Energy Economics, at 
1306-1315 (April 2010). 
18 Id. at 1307. 
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B.  Distributed Generation:  the Next Energy Revolution 
 
While deregulation problems continue to 
be worked out, industrial manufacturers are 
left to consider how to constrain costs on 
the regulated side.  This will inevitably lead 
to the next “quiet revolution” to our 
national energy paradigm:  the shift from 
centralized to distributed electricity 
generation (DG).  The best way to constrain 
grid costs, as well as RTO generation 
capacity charges, is to substantially reduce 
reliance upon the grid.  DG is the best 
available strategy to accomplish this.  
It has long been thought that energy 
intensive industries like steel, glass and 
chemical manufacturing could be “ground 
zero” for rethinking how energy is 
generated and used in America.   These 
industries consume large amounts of fossil 
fuels and electricity to melt scrap iron, iron 
ore, and sand, and to produce chemicals.   
Recycling the waste heat from these 
industries could itself generate some 5% of 
America’s electricity needs.19  Likewise, in 
Gotherburg, Sweden two refineries use 
waste heat to provide nearly half the 
450,000 residents of that town with district 
heating.  None of the 150 refineries in 
America, including the several that operate 
in Ohio, recycle waste heat for use in 
residential heating.20 
Ohio is uniquely placed to play a leading 
role in the advent of distributed generation.   
That is because the many locations where 
DG is likely to first become economical are 
those involving generation at industrial 
sites, and Ohio is among the nation’s 
                                                        
19
 Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 32. 
20
 Id. 
leaders in generation capacity from 
industrial waste heat.  According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Ohio has 
enough waste heat to generate the 
equivalent power of 8 nuclear power plants, 
leading some observers to characterize 
Ohio as the “Saudi Arabia of 
cogeneration.”21   The Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory projects that waste heat 
recovery systems can be available for 
around $1500/kW installed22 – a price that 
should be attractive for electricity intensive 
manufacturing.  The potential to avoid 
future carbon taxes and to create jobs also 
makes this of considerable interest to 
Ohio’s policy makers.23 
Two other factors will likely lead to the 
advent of distributed generation in Ohio.  
The first is the April 2012 adoption of new 
federal EPA Clean Air Act pollution 
standards (the so-called “Boiler MACT” 
regulations)24 that will cause area-wide 
                                                        
21
 L. Marginelli, “The Case for Gray Power,” The 
Nation, February 15, 2010 
(http://www.thenation.com/article/case-gray-
power).   
22
 Id.  
23
 According to Policy Matters, Ohio, as many as 
20,000 jobs could be created from cogeneration, and 
the release into the atmosphere of 13 metric tons of 
carbon could be avoided.    See “Capturing Waste 
Energy In Ohio: Using Combined Heat and Power to 
Our Electric System,” Policy Matters Ohio (March 
2012) 
(http://www.policymattersohio.org/combined-heat-
power-march2012).   
24
 See 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/comustion/docs/201
11202overviews.pdf.  The Ohio Public Utilities 
Commission resolved in February 2012 to develop an 
educational forum to begin a pilot program designed 
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capital investment into new, cleaner steam 
generation capacity.   Many Ohio industries 
have large, old coal boilers producing large 
volumes (over 100,000 lbs/hr) of steam.   
These boilers tend to work continuously, 
are inefficient, and require as fuel low sulfur 
“compliance coal.”25   Industrial users that 
are considering an upgrade of their coal 
boilers in order to comply with the new 
rules may find this to be a convenient time 
to convert to more efficient heat creating 
systems, such as combined heat and power 
(CHP).  With these systems, electricity made 
as a byproduct of generating heat can be 
converted for use on site, thereby 
dramatically improving systemic efficiency.     
The second factor relates to grid 
congestion, especially in Northern Ohio.  It 
has been recognized for some time that the 
traditional American energy model -- large 
centralized generation plants with a robust 
grid system with a nearly ubiquitous reach – 
is no longer the best model for future 
planning.   Northern Ohio, in particular, has 
been grid constrained for a number of 
years.   As a result, and in anticipation of 
retiring old coal burning generation 
facilities, First Energy now plans to 
undertake a $1 billion transmission 
upgrade.26  Some experts have questioned 
                                                                                   
to develop and share information about combined 
heat and power as a strategy for compliance with 
the new Boiler MACT rules.    
25
 S. Casten “EPA’s Boiler MACT Is an Economic 
Growth Opportunity,” (June 15, 2012) 
http://grist.org/article/epas-boiler-mact-is-an-
economic-growth-opportunity/.  Compliance coals 
run around $90/ton, or $3.60/mmbtu.   If a boiler is 
75% efficient, this means that the cost of delivered 
steam would be $4.80/mmbtu.   Id.   
26
 J. Funk, “First Energy Will Spend $1 Billion on High 
Voltage Transmission Lines and Substations,” 
Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 18, 2012); 
the wisdom of such an investment when 
distributed generation has become 
increasingly cost effective, and passing 
these transmission costs through to 
manufacturers will inevitably lead to 
product price increases and possibly 
compromise competitiveness.27    
In the meantime, as set forth earlier, RTO 
capacity charges are on the rise.  PJM 
anticipates that there will be changes in the 
next several years to Ohio’s generation fleet 
on an “unprecedented scale.”28  PJM 
announced in May 2012 that it had 
purchased as power supplies in its auction 
for 2015-16 a “record amount of new 
generation.”  Northern Ohio suffered the 
highest prices in the PJM market -- $357 per 
Megawatt, more than twice the PJM base 
price of $136 per Megawatt.29 
In addition to rising transmission and 
capacity charges, Ohio manufacturing faces 
an additional threat that could be resolved, 
in part, by switching to distributed 
generation:  carbon regulation.   Driven in 
part by EPA requirements to either clean up 
or shut down old coal plants and in part by 
a depressed natural gas market, much of 
coal electricity generation will be replaced 
by natural gas in the coming years.  
According to one recent study, even 
                                                                                   
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012
/05/firstenergy_will_spend_1_billi.html. 
27
 See e.g. L. Traves, “Another Bad Energy Policy for 
Ohio,” Crain’s Cleveland Business (May 29, 2012), 
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20120529/
BLOGS05/120529844/1241/newsletter04. 
28
 PJM News Release, “PJM Capacity Auction Secures 
Record Amounts of New Generation, Demand 
Response and Energy Efficiency” (May 18, 2012); 
http://pjm.com/about-
pjm/newsroom/announcements-and-news-
releases.aspx.  
29
 Id. at 2. 
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accounting for a marginal increase in life 
cycle greenhouse gases generated through 
hydraulic fracturing, burning natural gas 
emits less than half the carbon that burning 
coal does.30  This reduction in carbon 
emissions will likely become a critical 
economic element to the viability of Ohio 
manufacturing in the coming years, as 
increasing restrictions are placed on carbon 
emissions.      
                                                        
30
 N. Hultman, et al, “The Greenhouse Impact of 
Unconventional Gas for Electricity Generation,” 
Environmental Research Letters (IOP Science 
October 2011)(Online at:  
stacks.iop.org/ERL/6/044008).    
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III.   Distributed Generation in Manufacturing   
 
Distributed generation (DG) has become 
increasingly the focus of energy policy 
research.  DG promises not only improved 
energy efficiency, but also improved 
environmental quality and lower costs.   
However capturing the full range of 
advantages offered by a DG system 
depends upon the circumstances of each 
location.  It may depend, for instance, upon 
the integration of energy management 
systems and complementary technologies 
such as control systems or uninterruptible 
power supplies.31 
However the benefits do not inure solely to 
the industrial users.  Utilities, too, can and 
should benefit from DG systems.   Besides 
the development of ancillary generation 
services from this industry, utilities also 
benefit from avoided transmission and 
distribution improvements, more 
predictable demand profiles and improved 
asset utilization.32  As noted by energy 
pundit Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain 
Institute, the old model of centralized 
generation with a ubiquitous grid was based 
upon the 20th century idea that generation 
was less reliable than the grid.   But the 21st 
century reality turns this model on its head 
– today, generation, especially gas turbine, 
is more reliable than the grid.  Accordingly, 
one of the fundamental reasons for 
centralized generation no longer exists.33  
                                                        
31
 D. King, “The Regulatory Environment for 
Interconnected Electric Power Micro-grids:  Insights 
from State Regulatory Officials,” Carnegie Mellon 
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper CEIC-05-08 
(2008).   
32
 Id. at 2. 
33
 A. Lovins, E. Datta, T. Feiler, K. Rabago, J. Swisher, 
A. Lehmann, and K.Wicker, Small is Profitable: The 
As Lovins notes, today “the cheapest, most 
reliable power” is that which is “produced 
at or near the customers.”34 
Ohio policy makers have recognized the 
value of DG, and have enacted regulatory 
reform designed to encourage its 
deployment.  In 2008 Ohio Senate Bill 221 
revised current rules for the adoption of DG 
such that manufacturing companies need 
no longer own the DG facilities, but need 
only “host” facilities owned by others.  This 
enabled manufacturers to have third parties 
own and operate the generation facility, 
potentially avoiding not only an up front 
capital outlay, but also having to operate a 
facility which may be beyond the scope of 
their expertise.    Second, SB 221 enabled 
net metering for certain forms of DG, 
specifically wind, solar and biomass 
generation, such that the full value of 
electricity delivered at that site could be 
realized.  Net metering for these specific 
forms of generation is such that the meter 
runs backwards when production is greater 
than that used on site.    Senate Bill 315, 
enacted in May 2012, added waste heat 
recovery systems to this category of 
electricity generation.35   Third, Senate Bills 
                                                                                   
Hidden Economic Benefits of Making Electrical 
Resources the Right Size at 2, Rocky Mountain 
Institute: Snowmass, Colorado (2002);  
http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-
Center/Library/U01-13_SmallIsProfitable.   
34
 A. Lovins, Small is Profitable at 2. 
35
 Since waste heat recovery systems can be quite 
large, this may prove controversial.   The Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had previously 
ruled that SB 221 had an implied limitation to the 
size of the system qualifying as a renewable 
because, by statute, a net-metered system must be 
intended to offset part or all of the customer-
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221 and 315 also provide for Renewable 
Energy Credits for generation of renewable 
energy, including Waste Heat Recovery.   
Combined heat and power, however, has 
no similar program in place.  CHP systems 
can be operated behind the meter in Ohio, 
but otherwise SB 221, as originally crafted, 
offered little more help.36   Utilities do not 
have to pay the value of electricity 
delivered when taking power back onto the 
grid.   Instead, they pay what they consider 
to be the value of displaced power, 
calculated at the cost of generation at some 
distant centralized point.   The actual 
electrons may be delivered to a 
manufacturer down the road 100 yards, but 
the utility is not required to compensate for 
the strategic location of the power 
generation.37 
                                                                                   
generator's electricity requirements.   However 
waste heat recovery systems found in industrial 
settings may offset a large load.  The result is that 
the classification of waste heat recovery systems as 
renewable under SB 221 may impact the rate of 
adoption of other renewable systems, such as wind 
or biomass.  
36
 As set forth in Section III(A), infra, Senate Bill 315 
did provide new incentives for CHP by modifying SB 
221 to allow large energy users to potentially obtain 
a waiver on a rider that is designed to enable utilities 
to recover costs incurred in meeting the energy 
efficiency programs set forth in SB 221.  
37
 Ohio’s original net-metering law was enacted in 
1999 as part of the state’s electric-industry 
restructuring legislation. The Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) later revised its net 
metering rules in March 2007, prompted by the 
federal Energy Policy Act of 2005.  Initially, PUCO 
required utilities to credit customer net excess 
generation at the utility's full retail rate. However, in 
June 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that each 
utility must credit excess generation to the customer 
at the utility's unbundled generation rate. See:  
http://energy.gov/savings/ohio-net-metering. 
This policy, along with the general policy of 
guaranteeing a “cost plus” recovery on 
expenditures on the still-regulated grid, has 
led to the traditional utilities being 
incentivized to allocate as much of their 
costs as possible to the grid, and as little as 
possible to generation.  Not surprisingly, we 
see as a result widely disparate estimates 
for the cost of power production from 
centralized generation.   Utility accounting 
under this system, which may not include 
such things as the anticipated cost of 
decommissioning a nuclear power plant, 
typically sets a low generation cost for 
nuclear power. Yet the cost for nuclear 
energy generation, by most measurements, 
is very high.38   
 
                                                        
38
 See e.g. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 
274-290.  This policy of allocating costs when 
possible to the grid rather than to generation, in 
addition to ensuring the cost-plus return, also 
ensures that the existing utility generation is highly 
competitive in the wholesale market. 
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A.  Limited Sales Options for Net Excess Generation Discourage Self-
Generation   
Unless the on site generation falls under the 
Senate Bill 221 or 315 definition of a 
“renewable energy,” excess generation 
must be sold back into the grid at the 
unbundled “generation rate” for power.  
Under such circumstances, the return for 
generation is significantly diminished:  there 
is no value attributed to the strategic 
location of the generation near a market.   If 
the generation is sufficiently big (above 138 
kV), there will likely be an available 
interstate market, although there will also 
likely be a queue of companies looking to 
sell such power therein.39    Even when such 
sales are available, however, there will still 
be no allocation of value for the strategic 
location of the generation.  The result is 
that excess power placed into the grid is 
likely to get off-peak, wholesale prices for 
such electricity. 
For systems generating power below 138 
kV, however, no interstate market is 
available.  Utilities are required to purchase 
the power if the generation is from a 
qualified facility, but only at the displaced 
generation price (i.e. the “avoided cost of 
generation”).  In Ohio, the avoided cost has 
been set as low as $0.012/kw-hr.40 
Accordingly, smaller systems will likely not 
                                                        
39
 K. Wissman, “CHP and PUCO” Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio Workshop on CHP (March 
2012). See: 
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry
-information/industry-topics/combined-heat-and-
power-in-ohio/.  The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission would regulate an interstate sale of 
power by a distributed generator into the wholesale 
market.  
40
 Id.  
even recover the going rate for unbundled 
wholesale generation.   
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B.  Excessive Standby Rates Threaten Combined Heat and Power Generation  
 
Manufacturers that operate or host 
distributed generation on their property 
commonly need to have back up power 
available for those times when the DG is not 
generating electricity.  The Federal Public 
Utility Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires 
utilities to provide standby service to its 
customers who develop “qualified” 
distributed generation facilities.  Rates, 
terms and conditions for standby power are 
typically set by the state utility regulatory 
commission.41 
Utilities use two sorts of contracts to sell 
power to large-scale power users.  The first 
is the “Full Requirements Contract,” 
pursuant to which the customer agrees to 
purchase his entire electrical load from the 
provider.   Under these contracts, there are 
two principal costs:  (1) the Energy Charge, 
which is the charge for actual consumption 
of kW-hrs), and (2) the Demand Charge 
(sometimes also called a “Capacity 
Charge,”)42 which is a charge for the 
                                                        
41
 18 CFR Section 292.303(b) (“obligation to sell to 
qualifying facilities.”) 
42
 Demand charges are used to recover the capital 
costs of maintaining the capacity necessary to meet 
the customer’s peak load requirements, but also the 
system as a whole.  Residential and small 
commercial contracts oftentimes do not separate 
Demand and Energy charges, but instead roll them 
into one charge.   See R. Weston, et al, “Standby 
Rates for Customer-Sited Resources,” U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of 
Atmospheric Programs, at 3 (December 2009); 
www.epa.gov/chp/documents/standby_rates.pdf.   
Unfortunately, the electricity industry does not 
always have uniform terminology for its different 
charges, and this creates considerable confusion for 
those who are trying to understand billing protocols.   
See e.g. 
incurred cost of maintaining a sufficient 
peak demand delivery capability.   The 
latter charge is priced on a per kW basis, 
and is based on a peak demand interval of 
between 15 to 30 minutes during a given 
period, commonly one month.43 
The second type of power purchasing 
contract is for those customers who 
generate a portion of their own electricity 
on site.   These “Partial Requirements 
Contracts” include provisions that address 
the need for not only supplying the normal 
shortfall between requirements and on site 
generation (“supplemental power”), but 
also supplying back up power during 
periods of scheduled or unscheduled 
outages.   These sorts of contracts have four 
categories of charge:  (1) supplemental 
service, charged on a kW-hr basis for actual 
power used under a rate schedule; (2) 
scheduled back up service, for those times 
when maintenance is scheduled (usually 
during non-peak hours); (3) unscheduled 
back up service, for when the customer’s 
system goes off line unexpectedly, and 
usually immediately; and (4) Capacity 
Charge, which is a per kW cost for capacity 
reserved to be delivered in the event that 
the customer has to be served for any 
                                                                                   
http://www.teachmefinance.com/Scientific_Terms/
Capacity_charge.html.    
43
 G. Miller, C. Haefke and J. Cuttica, “Iowa On-Site 
Generation Tariff Barrier Overview,” at 7, 
Environmental Law & Policy Center (April 2012).   
Miller, et al, also refers to “capacity” charges as 
“reservation” charges.  There are also other smaller 
charges, such as a fixed “Customer Charge” for 
administration costs, and for taxes.   
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length of time at the maximum load 
possible.44    
A more recent study characterizes these 
four groups as “supplementary, backup, 
maintenance and interruptible power” – all 
of which can be grouped together in a 
single “standby tariff.” 45  For purposes of 
determining a standby rate, the author 
considers three charges:  (1) fixed charges, 
(2) volumetric charges and (3) demand 
charges.   Fixed charges are intended to 
cover infrastructure supply and delivery 
costs, regardless of the customer’s actual 
monthly requirements.  Volumetric charges 
are set by the actual energy consumed, and 
can be metered.   The demand charges are 
set by the maximum power used during a 
specified time period, and are intended to 
compensate the utility for the fixed costs of 
infrastructure shared with other customers, 
in proportion to the capacity each 
requires.46 
Simplicity and transparency in standby rate 
design is apparently not so easy to 
accomplish.  Disaggregating and 
determining the cost components of a 
standby rate can make for a complex and 
confusing rate structure.  Any of these 
charges can bear portions of what amounts 
to a “standby charge.” However it appears 
to be the demand/capacity (depending 
upon the nomenclature) charge that creates 
the most controversy.    
It is within this fee that many argue utilities 
overcharge.  This is especially so for those 
where demand/capacity charges are based 
                                                        
44
 Id. at 7-8. 
45
 T. Stanton, “Electric Utility Standby Rates: Updates 
for Today and Tomorrow” at 2, National Regulatory 
Research Institute (July 2012).   
46
 Id. at 8-9.   
upon a “ratchet” device.  Ratchets 
commonly set demand/capacity charges at 
the highest priced power used in any 
interval within a given period of time (for 
example, a year) – with the interval 
oftentimes as small as fifteen minutes.  
At the outset, it should be noted that the 
public policy case for the assessment of any 
standby fee is by no means clear.  Utilities 
justify them by arguing that (1) they are 
necessary to recover the costs associated 
with providing the ability to generate and 
deliver peak power in the event of an 
outage, and (2) they prevent cross-
subsidization of DG customers by non-DG 
customers.47   Further, utilities argue, 
customers with DG systems have no 
obligation to generate power; if a customer 
decides to discontinue DG operations, the 
utility could, in theory, be required to serve 
that full load on an ongoing basis.   
Proponents of DG argue that these 
arguments are self-serving.  First, standby 
does not create a material cost for the 
utilities.  Only the last several hundred feet 
of wire is typically unique to the end user – 
the vast majority of the grid is spread 
among multiple users.  Moreover, it is 
highly unlikely that all DG would 
malfunction at a “coincident peak time.”  In 
short, having all customers paying for 
maximum back up peak power assumes 
that all customers will have a simultaneous, 
unplanned DG outage – a scenario that 
defies logic.    Second, non-DG users will 
actually benefit from DG; therefore, no 
cross-subsidization exists.  Any measures 
                                                        
47
 S. Casten, “Are Standby Rates Ever Justified?  The 
Case Against Electric Utility Standby Charges as a 
Response to On-Site Generation,” at 58, The 
Electricity Journal, 1040-6190/03 (Elsevier Science 
Inc. May 2003).   
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that reduce the need for repair or 
construction of distribution and 
transmission assets inures to the benefit of 
all users, not just the DG end users.48    At 
an average cost for grid development of 
approximately $1300-1400/kW49 -- a cost 
close to that of installing CHP – it is easy to 
see how ratepayers as a whole benefit from 
DG.  If, for instance, some or all of the 
planned $1 billion First Energy investment 
into upgrading the grid could be avoided by 
ramping up DG, this avoided cost would be 
shared by all of its customers.   Indeed, 
according to one expert, the only cross-
subsidization going on with the build out of 
DG under current regulations is by the 
ratepayers to the utilities.50  
Nevertheless, regulatory bodies are inclined 
to accept the utility arguments for the need 
for standby fees.   The problem, then, is to 
determine what charges are reasonable 
under the circumstances – and what 
charges can be borne by distributed 
generators without rendering the project 
unviable.   The Environmental Protection 
Agency has determined that unless the 
customer, by installing CHP, can avoid at 
least 90% of its otherwise applicable rate 
costs, CHP will not be viable.51   
Unfortunately, this number is one that is 
not commonly met with existing standby 
charges in most jurisdictions.  In a study by 
                                                        
48
 Casten, supra at 60-61.  See also Miller, supra, at 
8. 
49
 Casten, supra at 61. 
50
 Id. at 62.  For a counter perspective, see J. 
Morrison, “Why We Need Standby Rates for On-Site 
Generation,” The Electricity Journal, at 74-80, 1040-
6190 (Elsevier Science Inc. October 2003).   
51
 Weston, et al, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Climate 
Protection Partnerships Division, “Standby Rates for 
Customer-Sited Resources (Washington D.C.  2009).   
the Midwest Clean Energy Application 
Center, avoided cost percentages from 
utilities in Iowa, for instance, ranged from a 
low of 74% to a high of 81% among Iowa 
investor owned utilities.52  
Avoided cost, in this context, is that of a 
kW-hour not purchased from a utility due to 
on-site generation.  The closer the avoided 
cost comes to matching the price that 
would have been otherwise paid under a 
full requirements contract, the more the 
customer maximizes his savings with the 
CHP project.   These conditions are most 
likely met, according to the EPA, when (1) 
demand charges are small in relation to the 
energy costs; (2) demand charges are not 
ratcheted, or if they are, the window for 
determining the ratchet is reasonable; and 
(3) the supplemental contract prices for 
actual energy consumed are similar to what 
they would have been under a 
requirements contract.53  Accordingly, the 
EPA admonishes state regulators to “pay 
close attention to ensuring that the design 
of partial requirement rate structures 
captures the economic and environmental 
benefits of reduced energy consumption.”54 
Ohio does not have a statewide policy on 
standby rates55, and standby fees are in 
part subject to private negotiations.  The 
                                                        
52
 Miller, supra at 17.   At the time of this report, The 
Midwest Clean Energy Institute had undertaken no 
similar study of standby rates in Ohio. 
53
 Weston, Standby Rates for Customer-Sited 
Resources, at 17. 
54
 Id.   
55 However this may change.  In the winter of 
2013 the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had 
opened a docket for the purpose of taking 
comments on regulations controlling standby 
rates for CHP.  See In the Matter of the 
Commission’s Review of Chapter 4901:1-22 Ohio 
Administrative Code Regarding Interconnection 
Services, Case Record 12-2051-EL-ORD. 
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American Electric Power Company provides 
standby energy, but the commodity itself is 
purchased from another provider.  The 
standby fee is demand based, and billed 
from the contract demand.  Cincinnati Gas 
& Electric Company (Duke Energy) also has 
no specific standby rate, however charges 
fees based on peak demand.56  For 
Cincinnati Gas & Electric, the demand rate 
will be at least 85% of the highest monthly 
kilowatt demand as established in the 
summer period.57   
Ohio Edison's Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio tariff allows charges of up to $3.02 per 
kW for secondary voltage “Backup Capacity 
Reservation and Daily Backup Power.” 
Accordingly, based on this rate, a 25 MW 
industrial co-generation or commercial 
building CHP project could pay a monthly 
demand charge of $75,500, with total 
annual standby costs of $906,000.58    
The Cleveland Illuminating Company has 
both “capacity” and “demand” charges for 
supplemental contracts.   The “Capacity 
Reservation Charge” is broken down into 
“transmission and distribution” and 
“generation” charges, and is billed on a per 
kW basis, depending upon the voltage.  
Demand charges are broken down into two 
categories:  (1) supplemental demand and 
(2) back up demand.   Supplemental power 
is set by the rate schedule.  Back up 
demand, which covers both back up and 
maintenance situations, allows the 
                                                        
56
 See Energy & Environmental Analysis (2008); 
http://www.eea-
inc.com/rrdb/DGRegProject/States/Newsite/OHrevis
ed.html. 
57
 Id.   
58
 L.Traves, “Another Bad Energy Policy for Ohio,” 
Crain’s Cleveland Business, May 29, 2012; 
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20120529/
BLOGS05/120529844 
customer to choose one of two charge 
methods, the latter of which is eligible on 
only 15 days per year.   On top of these 
charges, there is a “maintenance charge,” 
plus “energy,” “reactive demand,” 
“emergency power” and “customer service” 
charges.   
The minimum charge for a month under the 
supplemental contract is “the sum of the 
Capacity Reservation charge multiplied by 
the Capacity Reservation, plus the 
Customer Charge, plus the minimum 
charges of any applicable Rate Schedules.” 
So, if no electricity is taken, the minimum 
monthly charge for a 25 MW high voltage 
system would be the customer charge 
($95.59) plus $3.38(25,000) = $84,595.50.59   
This totals over $1 mm per year in back up 
charges for a system that never even uses 
back up power – clearly a number that will 
have a chilling effect on any development of 
CHP.  
                                                        
59
 Partial Service Schedule, CEI 2012 Electric Service 
– 2011 PUCO Tariff at Original Sheet No. 46, PUCO 
No. 13 pages 1-9.   The CEI Partial Service Schedule 
can be found at:  See: 
https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/customer
/customer_choice/ohio_/ohio_tariffs.html   
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IV.   Strategies for Enabling Manufacturing-Based Distributed 
Generation in Ohio 
A. Energy Efficiency Credits Under Senate Bills 221 and 315 
 
Ohio Senate Bill 221, passed in 2008, 
requires that investor owned utilities in 
Ohio undertake energy efficiency 
improvements, among other mandates.60  
Those requirements are set forth as 
benchmarks.  The costs of meeting the 
mandate are passed along to ratepayers 
through a rider, known as the DSE-2.   To 
date, the DSE-2 rider has been relatively 
small.  However, as the requirements to 
improve efficiency increase over time, and 
as the easiest, least expensive work is 
completed, the DSE-2 rider is expected to 
rise. 
Large-scale electricity users, like 
manufacturers, can obtain a waiver for 
some or all the DSE-2 rider if they 
undertake energy efficiency improvements 
on their own.  Under SB 221 such 
manufacturers qualify as “mercantile” 
consumers, and as such, are eligible to 
follow a protocol leading ultimately to the 
Public Utility Commission approving the 
waiver.  
However SB 221 did not include any sort of 
incentive for manufacturers to utilize waste  
                                                        
60
 SB 221 requires that investor owned utilities 
obtain 12.5% of its energy generation from 
renewable sources by 2025.   Benchmarks were 
included on a year-to-year basis designed to reach 
that goal.   SB 221 also requires that utilities 
undertake efforts to meet a cumulative energy 
usage savings, compared against a base load set in 
2008, of 22% by 2025.  The energy usage savings is 
also benchmarked on a year-to-year basis.   See Ohio 
Revised Code Section 4928.01 et seq.  
heat or combined heat and power systems, 
either under the renewable portfolio or 
under the energy efficiency portfolio.   This 
oversight was addressed recently by the 
passage of Senate Bill 315.  Under SB 315, 
Waste Energy Recovery (WEH) systems are 
classified as “renewable” generation for 
purposes of qualifying for Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECS), and, importantly, for 
net metering purposes.61   SB 315 will have 
a catalyzing effect on the considerable WER 
potential market in Ohio, especially for 
large scale, energy intensive manufacturing 
where current processes generate large 
amounts of waste heat.   
But SB 315 did not include natural gas-fired 
CHP in the renewable category.62   
Accordingly, CHP enjoys neither the ability 
to generate RECS nor the ability to convert 
the value of surplus power to the value of 
electricity near the site of consumption.   SB 
                                                        
61
 Waste heat recovery systems – called Waste 
Energy Recovery under SB 315 -- can also be placed 
under the energy efficiency category, which may, 
under certain circumstances, be of more value than 
being classified as a renewable.   A waste energy 
recovery system is a facility that generates electricity 
through the conversion of byproduct heat from an 
industrial process.  See Ohio Revised Code Section 
4928.01 (36).   
62
 Presumably the reason CHP was not included as a 
renewable is because, unlike for WER systems, which 
use byproduct heat from existing industrial 
processes, gas-fired CHP introduces fossil fuels into 
the system.  See e.g. T.Odonnell, et al, “Governor 
Kasich Signs Far-Reaching Energy Bill Into Law,” 
Bricker & Eckler Bulletin, June 14, 2012; 
http://www.bricker.com/services/service-
details.aspx?serviceid=140   
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315 did, however, provide that CHP (and 
WEH) would qualify as a form of energy 
efficiency under the portfolio requirements 
as set forth in SB 221.   As the costs 
associated with meeting the SB 221 energy 
efficiency mandates increase over time, this 
could prove to be a significant incentive to 
develop CHP in distributed settings.   
Unfortunately it appears that 
manufacturers will have only a limited 
ability to take advantage of this incentive.   
Normally a manufacturer who implements 
energy efficiency measures enjoys the 
waiver of the DSE-2 rider on the remaining 
load he purchases from the utility.  But if 
the manufacturer goes off the grid by 
adding CHP, or otherwise reduces its load to 
a small supplemental contract, then the 
DSE-2 rider waiver has little value.  The only 
way for a manufacturer to obtain value 
from the waiver under these circumstances 
is if it aggregates its energy efficiency 
portfolio with other consumers who 
otherwise have no ability to obtain a 
waiver, and they in turn pay some value to 
the manufacturer for this purpose.   
The utility of course can install CHP itself to 
meet the standards, and then sell power 
therefrom through the grid. Indeed, this 
would also enable utilities to not lose the 
sale, which of course is the principal reason 
why utilities oppose DG – their profits are 
tied to their sales volume.  However so long 
as regulatory law guarantees a rate of 
return for the grid but not for generation, 
utilities will in general prefer using 
increasing centralized generation and grid 
capabilities over developing their own 
distributed generation.   
If manufacturers hope to monetize the 
value of CHP under the energy efficiency 
portfolio set forth in SB 221, it may have to 
engage the public utilities commission in 
developing a creative way for these credits 
to be passed through to the manufacturers 
who develop CHP.   If no such strategy can 
be found, it may have the effect of 
thwarting the intent of the legislature in 
passing this particular section of SB 315.   
Senate Bill 221 also includes qualifying CHP 
facilities as an “advanced energy” 
technology, which technologies are also 
required to be adopted by the investor-
owned utilities in a manner similar to how 
renewable is to be adopted. However that 
Bill did not set benchmarks to accomplish 
this.  Accordingly it is difficult to ascertain 
what, if any, value can be attributed to a 
CHP facility that qualifies as advanced 
technology under SB 221.  
Finally, Investor Owned Utilities can also 
incentivize CHP through their rebate 
programs designed to encourage energy 
efficiency, which could be taken in lieu of 
the DSE-2 rider waiver.   While the costs of 
the DSE-2 remains highly speculative, it 
appears that the rebates will not, over time, 
be as valuable as a waiver of the DSE-2 
rider, at least as most experts have been 
projecting the rider costs.   But if the waiver 
has little value to the manufacturer who is 
significantly reducing his utility load 
through CHP, this rebate could be of 
significant value.  Investor Owned Utilities 
are, however, likely to resist offering 
rebates for CHP facilities that reduce the 
consumer to supplemental contracts, since 
that would in turn reduce sales. 
B. Strategies for Funding Distributed Generation 
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1. Financing Options 
Manufacturing faces another substantial 
impediment when it comes to adopting DG.  
Upfront investments in CHP projects are 
high, and project returns often do not 
correspond to those required by 
manufacturers or commercial developers.63  
Unlike with universities, hospitals or 
cooperative utilities, where DG is likely to 
find its earliest opportunities, 
manufacturing does not have a long-term 
mandate to continue operations.   It can be 
difficult enough to get a manufacturer to 
agree to take on plant maintenance as part 
of its business portfolio, but when 
discussions are raised about commitments 
that will run 10 to 15 years out, 
manufacturers become skittish.   This is 
especially so because natural gas 
companies no longer offer fixed price 
contracts more than five years out, leaving 
the last 10-15 years of plant operation 
susceptible to an often volatile natural gas 
market.64   This certainly adds to the risk 
                                                        
63
 T. Kerr, “Cogeneration and District Energy,” at 20, 
International Energy Agency (2009).   A commonly 
used figure for the required payout for 
manufacturers is two years. 
64
 When natural gas first became available as a fuel, 
it was produced as a byproduct of oil production, 
and as such was oftentimes flared if no market 
existed.  This led to a nationwide effort to find 
markets for natural gas.  Producers and pipeline 
companies alike routinely entered into 20-25 year 
contracts at fixed rates, with little price adjustment.  
By the mid 1970’s, prices had skyrocketed for natural 
gas, as did costs for production, and those saddled 
with supplying these contracts were in financial 
trouble.   In the 1980’s, the reverse happened – 
prices crashed, and end users who were paying long-
term prices on gas contracts experienced the same 
sort of financial distress the suppliers did in the 
1970s – leading to years of “take or pay” litigation.  
The result of all of this turmoil caused by market 
fluctuation is that few distribution or transportation 
manufacturers face in converting coal 
boilers to gas-fired CHP.     
Usually one sees this issue manifest itself as 
a “competition for capital” – projects with 
long-term payouts simply cannot compete 
effectively for capital investment within a 
company.   One way around this “payout” 
problem is for third parties to own and 
operate the plant.  This also tends to 
resolve the problem of manufacturers 
having to become plant operation experts.   
However it also involves having a company 
commit to a long-term power purchase 
agreement – an obligation that could 
become problematic in the event that 
manufacturing is cut back or the plant is 
forced to close.   
The critical element to manufacturing-
based CHP finance, inevitably, is heat 
generation.  Manufacturers may not be 
keen to make long-term investments into 
electricity generation (or purchases), but 
they have little choice in most instances 
when it comes to generating heat.  Unless 
there is a thermal utility nearby capable of 
delivering their steam requirements under a 
short-term contract, the manufacturer will 
have to undertake some form of a capital 
commitment to acquire steam regardless.  
Accordingly, the best time for 
manufacturers to look at CHP is when they 
need to replace or upgrade their heat 
generation system.  With the onset of the 
new Boiler MACT rules, the time may well 
be now for many manufacturers.   
                                                                                   
companies will now enter into long-term contracts 
for fixed prices.   However with the advent of shale 
gas, and the resulting current gas surplus, this may 
change.  Indeed, in places like Ohio, where gas 
production is rich in liquids, gas is produced once 
again as a byproduct – a circumstance echoing the 
advent of the long-term gas contracts of the 1960’s. 
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Manufacturers that face uncertainty in 
investment into a CHP system – or that face 
a shortage of available capital to invest – 
will look for innovative financial strategies 
to enable CHP projects.  These will include 
state and federal programs for subsidized 
loans, loan guarantees, and the use of 
energy service companies (ESCOs). 
There are several programs at the federal 
and the state levels to assist financing of 
CHP systems. These programs typically fall 
under the categories of:  loans and loan 
guarantees, bonds, tax credits, tax 
exemptions, grants, rebates, and other 
credits and incentives.  At the federal level 
programs are offered by the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), the 
Department of Treasury, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  At the state level, 
programs are offered by the Ohio 
Department of Development - Office of 
Energy, Ohio Air Quality Development 
Authority, and investor-owned electric 
utilities such as Dayton Power and Light & 
First Energy Ohio.  A significant number of 
the programs are geared towards financing 
energy efficiency capital expenditures and 
renewable energy production.  However 
the DOE, along with other Departments and 
State Agencies, have several incentives 
specifically for developing combined heat 
and power projects.  
 
The most notable resource at the federal 
level is the DOE Loan Guarantee Program. 
Manufacturing is one of the three 
categories for which the DOE actively 
promotes projects. With a project target 
size of $25 million and up, this program may 
be suitable for financing large 
manufacturing CHP projects.  At the state 
level the Ohio Department of Development 
– Energy Loan Fund is the most suitable for 
manufacturers willing to invest in a CHP 
system.  The Energy Loan Fund provides 
financing through federal and state funding 
resources to eligible entities for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects. 
The projects funded through this program 
must result in energy savings of at least 15 
percent.  In addition to the Energy Loan 
Fund, The Ohio Air Quality Development 
Authority (OAQDA) provides assistance for 
new air quality improvement projects in 
Ohio.    
 
A list of some of the programs available to 
support CHP project financing include65: 
 
Federal 
 U.S. Department of Energy – Loan 
Guarantee Program 
 Qualified Energy Conservation 
Bonds 
State of Ohio 
 Ohio Department of Development – 
Energy Loan Fund 
 Ohio Job Stimulus Plan (Advanced 
Energy Program) 
                                                        
65
 See e.g. 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=US06F&re=0&ee=1; 
http://development.ohio.gov/Energy/Incentives/Ene
rgyLoanFund.htm; 
http://development.ohio.gov/Energy/Incentives/doc
uments/EnergyRLFOverviewGuidelines20120420.pdf
; and  
http://www.ohioairquality.org/advanced_energy_pr
ogram/.   See also C. Cain and A. Samanta, “New 
Energy for Older Cities,” at 19, Northeast Midwest 
Institute (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.nemw.org/index.php/news-
archive/342-nemwi-releases-report-on-new-energy-
for-older-cities 
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 Investor Owned Utility Rebate 
Programs 
 Ohio Air Quality Development 
Authority 
 
Another option for manufacturers for 
obtaining financing is to lease, rather than 
to purchase, the CHP system.  Leasing can 
allow for the transfer of tax advantages, 
such as credits or accelerated depreciation, 
to the party that can most benefit from 
them.66  The best strategy for 
manufacturers to lease such systems is to 
identify readily leasable standard gas-fired 
gensets, micro-turbines, and full size gas 
turbines as the basis of their programs.  By 
avoiding custom-designed generators, 
manufacturers can expect on the order of 
80% of the cost of a CHP installation to be 
covered by a lease, since these units can 
easily be recovered by the lessor and re-
used.  The susceptibility of the units to 
recovery also reduces the risk of stranded 
assets, and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of getting a shorter-term lease 
(or power purchase agreement, for that 
matter).  
Manufacturers may also expect support 
from their gas supplier, who can provide 
both an attractive supply contract for CHP, 
and possibly some support for the 
installation.  Ohio’s large gas suppliers such 
as NiSource-Columbia and Dominion, are 
likely to be highly interested in supporting 
incremental CHP use – especially as they 
continue to invest heavily in developing 
midstream infrastructure for the Utica and 
Marcellus Shale natural gas extraction.   
                                                        
66
 See:  “Procurement Guide: CHP Financing” at 12, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Combined 
Heat and Power Partnership; 
www.epa.gov/chp/documents/pguide_financing_op
tions.pdf. 
Programs to monetize environmental 
revenue streams may also provide 
additional funding for DG, including CHP.  In 
particular, under certain circumstances 
Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs) 
generated from a CHP facility may be 
”banked” under Ohio regulatory law, and 
emission reductions of nitrogen oxides, 
sulfur dioxide, volatile organic compounds 
and fine particulates can be tracked, 
accounted for, and ultimately traded.67 
2. Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives also provide a significant 
resource for financing a CHP or other DG 
project.    Incentives that are in the form of 
tax credits have the most value, especially 
those that are convertible to cash.  
However accelerated depreciation schemes 
also can have a significant impact on 
financing.  The federal government also 
includes an “Accelerated Modified 
Accelerated Cost-Recovery System” for 
depreciating capital investment costs for 
clean energy. 
Manufacturers may qualify for the Business 
Energy Investment Tax Credit, a federal 
energy tax credit totaling up to 30% of the 
total price for renewable distributed 
generation systems and up to 10% for gas-
fired CHP systems.  Qualifying renewable 
technologies include geothermal heat 
pumps, solar energy systems, wind energy 
systems, and fuel cells.    These systems 
                                                        
67
 See:  Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 
“Emission Reduction Credit Banking Program”, 
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/dapc/ERC/deposit.aspx 
See also:  United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, CHP Partnership, “Monetizing 
Environmental Benefits,” (March 2012); 
http://www.epa.gov/chp/funding/monetizing.html. 
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must be put into service by December 31, 
2016 in order to qualify for the tax credit.68    
Eligible CHP projects include systems of up 
to 50 MW that exceed 60% efficiency, and 
are subject to certain limitations and 
reductions for larger systems. The credit is 
equal to 10% of expenditures, with no 
maximum limit stated.  Biomass CHP 
systems may be eligible for the 30% tax 
credits.69  
An example of a State-based tax incentive is 
Ohio’s Qualified Energy Project Tax 
Exemption for businesses and industry, 
which “provides owners (or lessees) of 
renewable, clean coal, advanced nuclear, 
and cogeneration energy projects with an 
exemption from the public utility tangible 
personal property tax.”  Applicants with 
“clean coal, advanced nuclear, and 
cogeneration projects” must apply prior to 
December 31, 2013 to potentially qualify 
for the tax exemption. “Qualified Energy 
Projects” will be tax exempt as long as 
certain criteria continue to be met.70    
For qualifying projects, OAQDA financing 
may also lead to tax benefits.   The OAQDA 
can provide a 100 percent exemption from 
the tangible personal property tax, real 
property tax, and a portion of other taxes, 
such as the sales and use tax.  Furthermore, 
interest income on bonds and notes issued 
                                                        
68
 See: 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=US02F&re=1&ee=1  (citing 26 USC § 
48).  See also:  United States Department of Energy, 
“Tax Incentives for Energy Efficiency (2011); 
http://www.energysavers.gov/financial/70010.html. 
69
 Id.   
70
 Ohio Department of Development, “Qualified 
Energy Project Tax Exemption,” (2011), 
http:/development.ohio.gov/Business/AlternativeEn
ergyExemtption.htm.   
by OAQDA is exempt from state income 
tax.71  
                                                        
71
 ACEEE’s Energy Efficiency State Ranking (2010); 
http://www.aceee.org/energy-efficiency-
sector/state-policy/ohio/207/all/195.  Ohio ranked 
24
th
 among the 50 states, according to the ACEEE.    
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C. Microgrids 
 
One way to capture the full potential of DG 
is through a distribution system 
architecture called a “microgrid.”   Although 
some do not distinguish between DG and a 
microgrid, a microgrid consists of much 
more than a single point of generation.   
Like DG, however, a microgrid should have 
the ability to isolate itself (islanding) from 
the utility’s distribution system during a grid 
disturbance. This is accomplished through 
power electronic interfaces and a single, 
high-speed switch. During a disturbance, 
the microgrid can be separated from the 
utility’s distribution system, isolating the 
microgrid’s load from the disturbance 
without harming the integrity of the utility’s 
system. Islanding has the potential to 
provide a higher level of reliability to end 
users than that provided by the macrogrid 
system as a whole. Once normal conditions 
are returned, the microgrid automatically 
resynchronizes and reconnects itself to the 
grid.72   
The microgrid is capable of using an 
assortment of power generation resources, 
including renewable generation.  However 
the most common use considered is in 
those areas where heat generation is also 
required, since this is where efficiencies can 
be maximized.  Accordingly, the typical 
microgrid uses DG and cogeneration to 
provide both electricity and heat to multiple 
                                                        
72
 A. Neville, “Microgrids promise improved power 
quality and reliability,” at 1, Power (June 15, 2008), 
http://www.powermag.com/business/Microgrids-
promise-improved-power-quality-and-
reliability_134_p3.html.   For purposes of this 
discussion, non-grid connected microgrids are not 
considered, although these may have some 
application in more isolated areas.   
customers joined together on a local 
network.   It is interconnected with the local 
utility a single point, and operates in 
parallel with that system.   The most 
successful forms of micro-grids will be 
“smart,” meaning they will provide their 
customers with the ability to manage their 
demand, so as to optimize performance and 
cost.73   In addition, they will enable the grid 
managers to remove common causes of 
market failure in centralized generation, 
such as an underinvestment in energy 
efficiency, by retaining responsibility for not 
only generation and fuel choices, but also 
for end-use equipment, storage capacity, 
and waste stream opportunities.74    
Microgrids also offer potential advantages 
in power quality and reliability (PQR); 
indeed, one analyst calls this the 
fundamental distinction between the micro 
and macrogrids.75   Utilities place much 
effort and value on producing high-quality, 
homogeneous power, sufficient to meet the 
needs of most end-users.  End-users, in 
turn, try to build their usage models around 
this quality.  Notwithstanding this, end-
users, especially manufacturers, have 
heterogeneous quality requirements, and 
the microgrid offers a way to tailor quality 
to their needs.  Indeed, most PQM 
problems originate in the distribution 
                                                        
73
 D. King, “The Regulatory Environment for 
Interconnected Electric Power Micro-Grids:  Insights 
from State Regulatory Officials,” Carnegie Mellon 
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper CEIC-05-
08, at 3 (May 2008) (www.cmu.edu/electricity).   
74
 C. Marnay, H. Asano, et al, Policy Making for 
Microgrids, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine at 67 
(May/June 2008).   
75
 Neville, “Microgrids promise improved power 
quality and reliability” at 2.  
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network, and the closer the control over 
PQM is to the point of use, the easier it is to 
control.  Unfortunately, however, under 
current economic models, PQR is not 
valued,76 which is a significant deterrent to 
the adoption of microgrids.  
Microgrids maximize the value of both 
power and heat provided by co-generation 
because the power and heat are used close 
to the location where they are generated.  
The generator is able to sell the power to a 
neighboring customer without having to go 
through the local utility.   Microgrids also 
improve efficiency in distribution of energy 
and mitigate environmental consequences 
of generation.   In addition, they can help 
utilities reduce equipment expenditures 
and help with asset utilization.77  
Unfortunately, in most states, microgrids 
are allowed only in limited circumstances 
under current regulatory schemes.   
Generally, if the microgrid is controlled and 
operated by a utility, State regulators will 
view it with favor.  If, on the other hand, it 
is controlled and operated by the customers 
or the generator, or by an independent firm 
that manages the microgrid, it will be 
viewed unfavorably.   If the interconnection 
to the grid is high voltage, it may or may not 
be governed by a different set of rules.  But 
it does enable the microgrid to participate 
in the wholesale electric market.   This 
would introduce some regulatory 
components or rules that may be different, 
such as those imposed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission or the 
Regional Transmission Organization.78   
                                                        
76
 Id. at 3. 
77
 King at 2.   
78
 Id. at 4. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the 
applicability of utility tariffs and 
interconnection procedures for microgrids.   
Utilities, of course, are concerned about 
safety issues as well as system stability.   
Procedures can and have been designed by 
such groups as the IEEE, PJM and FERC to 
mitigate problems.   Even so, there is 
uncertainty in how these standards will be 
applied in the various states. 79   
In 2011, a significant step forward was 
taken by the development of the IEEE 
P1547.4 standard, which does much to 
mitigate utility safety and other concerns 
over grid-connected microgrids.  Instead of 
viewing microgrids as potentially 
disconnecting their loads, now they can be 
viewed as a source of demand response.80    
However IEEE P1547.4 is, to date, a 
voluntary compliance rule in most 
jurisdictions. 
In Ohio it is uncertain whether microgrids 
can be built at the distribution level.81  It is 
also unclear whether Ohio’s current 
interconnection procedures or 
requirements would be applicable to 
microgrids.82  Clarity will be required in the 
regulatory law governing microgrids before 
they can be advanced as a macrogrid-
                                                        
79
 Id. at 8.   
80
 P.Carson, “Grid-tied microgrids: a utility's best 
friend?”  Intelligent Utility (January 3, 2012), 
http://www.intelligentutility.com/article/12/01/grid-
tied-microgrids-utilitys-best-friend. 
81
 King at 16.   Utilities, however, can undertake 
micro-grid development.  AEP has, for instance, 
taken some first steps towards a micro-grid of sorts:  
they have installed community electricity storage 
devices (lithium ion batteries) in a few test locations.  
See 
https://www.aepohio.com/save/demoproject/newt
echnology/CES.aspx.      
82
 Id.  
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connected enabler of CHP or other 
distributed generation.  Because of Ohio’s 
regulatory laws governing investor-owned 
utilities, cooperative and municipal utilities 
are likely to move more quickly than 
manufacturers to take advantage of the 
microgrid's capabilities to deliver 
distributed generation.  
D. Decoupling Electricity Sales from Utility Profits 
 
One strategy that may help enable the 
adoption of DG is a regulatory device 
known as “decoupling.”  Utility regulators 
have long recognized the fundamental 
conflicts that exist in a regulatory system 
that seeks to reward utilities for both selling 
electricity and for encouraging consumers 
to conserve.  Under traditional regulation, 
utilities make more money when they sell 
more electricity.  But this is hard to 
reconcile with public policy objectives for 
using less electricity, or at least using 
electricity more efficiently.    This dilemma 
is known as the “throughput incentive 
problem.”83 
Complicating this issue further is the 
phenomenon known as “Jevon’s Paradox,” 
(or sometimes, the “rebound effect”) which 
states that the more one improves 
efficiencies in use of resource, the more 
one encourages new and additional uses of 
that resource.84   Many have argued that 
state-regulated energy efficiency programs 
are doomed to failure due to Jevon’s 
                                                        
83
 J. Lazar, F. Weston, et al, “Revenue Regulation and 
Decoupling:  A Guide to Theory and Application,” 
The Regulatory Assistance Project, at iv (June 2011). 
84
 See e.g. D. Owen, “Annals of Environmentalism:  
The Energy Efficiency Dilemma” at 78, The New 
Yorker, December 18, 2010.  URL: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/20/
101220fa_fact_owen.  William Stanley Jevon was an 
English economist.  In his 1865 book entitled the 
“Coal Question,” he observed that improvements in 
efficiency in coal burning technology had led to a 
proliferation of new coal burning uses, and a 
resulting increase in coal consumption.  
Paradox.  A common example given is result 
of the federal program to improve energy 
efficiency in refrigerators, which, instead of 
reducing the electricity consumed from 
refrigeration, led to a proliferation of 
multiple refrigerator households.  The 
counter argument to this is that energy 
efficiency programs are not necessarily 
about reducing electricity consumption, but 
about reducing waste.  If two refrigerators 
in every home improve the quality of life in 
those homes (and perhaps also reduces 
food waste), then the goals of the energy 
efficiency programs have been met.   In 
short, energy efficiency programs should be 
less about reducing energy consumption 
and more about reducing waste.   In the 
end, we know what utilities think about 
Jevon’s Paradox; they never voluntarily put 
demand side energy efficiency programs in 
place.  To the extent that Jevon’s Paradox is 
a real phenomenon, there would be no 
need for decoupling electricity throughput 
from profit – energy efficiency, distributed 
generation and demand response all should 
act to increase throughput and therefore 
utility profits under traditional regulatory 
schemes.   
Jevon’s Paradox is also insufficiently 
proven85 to convince policy makers that 
programs like energy efficiency, distributed 
                                                        
85
 See e.g. Think Progress, “Debunking Jevon’s 
Paradox,” February 16, 2011; 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/02/16/20753
2/debunking-jevons-paradox-jim-barrett/?mobile=nc 
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generation or demand response are really 
encouraged under current utility revenue 
models.  As a result more and more policy 
makers are coming to believe that the 
throughput model for measuring utility 
profits is not in the best interest of society.   
Instead, these policy makers have sought a 
model that decouples profits from 
throughput and realigns them with what 
they believe to be in society’s interests.     
Under traditional regulation, a utility’s 
recovery of expenses (revenue 
requirement) is based upon determining 
the net equity investment (i.e. expenses) 
and adding thereto an allowed rate of 
return, plus taxes.86   The rate case price is 
then determined by dividing that number 
by the sales in kWhs for the period of time 
the expenses were incurred.  Expenses are 
broken down into production and non-
production costs.   Production costs are 
composed of fuel and purchased power 
costs, with some operation and 
maintenance and third party transmission 
expenses included.   These expenses will 
vary directly with consumption.  Non-
production costs are those that are related 
to the delivery of electricity – transmission, 
distribution and retail services.   This 
includes non-production operations and 
maintenance, depreciation on equipment 
and interest on debt.  These normally do 
                                                        
86
 Lazar, “Revenue Regulation and Decoupling”, at 4.  
If a utility with $100 mm in expenses is allowed a 
10% rate of return, and it pays taxes at a 35% rate, 
its total revenue requirement is $115.38 mm ($100 
mm + $10 mm + $5.38 mm).   To get to the rate case 
price, the revenue requirement is then divided by 
the total sales in kWhs for the year.  So if there is 1 
billion kWhs delivered in the year those expenses 
are incurred, the $115.38 mm is divided by that 
number, leaving a rate price of $0.115/kWh.  Id.   
not vary much with consumption, at least 
not in the short run.87    
There are several ways to approach 
decoupling, all of which share a goal of 
recovering a defined amount of revenue, 
independent of sales volume.88   But the 
essential element is the migration of certain 
cost items into or out of the production cost 
recovery mechanism.   Full decoupling 
insulates the utility’s revenue collections 
from any deviation of actual sales from 
expected sales.   Any deviation results in an 
adjustment of revenue to match a pre-
arranged budget, such as the revenue 
recovered in the last rate case.    
Under a decoupling scheme, a customer’s 
bill is not decoupled from consumption. 
Accordingly, the customer retains a 
financial incentive to reduce energy 
consumption, while the utility retains its 
ability to recover costs and revenue.89 
Decoupling eliminates a strong disincentive 
that utilities have to invest in energy 
efficiency.   It does not, however, by itself 
incentivize distributed generation.  It 
merely removes the natural hostility 
utilities might otherwise have for DG, since 
it no longer impacts near term profits.90  As 
of 2009, 17 states have implemented 
decoupling mechanisms, including 28 
                                                        
87
 Id. at 4-6.   
88
 Id. at 8.  Utah, Oregon, California, Hawaii and 
Massachusetts are among some of the states that 
employ some aspects of decoupling.  Id.    For a full 
explanation of the different decoupling mechanisms, 
see id. at 8-20.   
89
 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 
“Decoupling Policies:  Options for Encouraging 
Energy Efficiency,” (Dec. 2009);  
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46606.p 
90
 Lazar, “Revenue Regulation and Decoupling,” at 
12.   
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natural gas distribution utilities and 12 
electric utilities. Six other states are in the 
process of implementing decoupling 
mechanisms.  California, New York, 
Maryland and Wisconsin had decoupled 
both electricity and natural gas.91   
In Ohio Senate Bill 221 established the 
authority for the Ohio Public Utilities 
Commission to establish rules for revenue 
decoupling mechanisms for electric 
distribution utilities, pursuant to Ohio 
Revised Code 4926.66(D)).   Decoupling can 
be included in an electric utility’s “Energy 
Security Plan” (see ORC 4928.143(B)(2)(h)).   
However to date it does not seem that any 
utilities in Ohio have sought to implement a 
full decoupling program.   
                                                        
91
 NREL, “Decoupling Policies,” supra, at 6. 
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E. Self-Generation Investment Programs 
 
California has the best-known incentive 
program for self-generation:  the Self-
Generation Incentive Program (SGIP).  It 
provides rebates for customers of utilities 
for installing qualifying distributed 
generation technologies.  The SGIP 
“represents a publicly funded rebate 
program that is intended to help reduce the 
price of DG technologies to the point where 
these technologies are competitive in the 
market place without incentives.”92  The 
program was originally designed as a “peak 
load reduction” strategy, as a response to 
the energy crisis California incurred in 
2001.93  According to an independent study 
undertaken by Itron, Inc., the benefits to 
society have met or exceeded the costs 
incurred for nearly all the DG technologies 
approved, with the notable exception of 
storage technologies.94    
 
The technology installed should be 
designed to meet some or all of the on-site 
electricity requirements, with the potential 
for exporting some power back to the grid.  
Combined heat and power is among those 
technologies that qualify, although 
renewable technologies may enjoy greater 
                                                        
92
 California Public Utilities Commission, “Self 
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2007), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
aboutsgip.htm.   A few states, including California, 
also provide for price control on natural gas used in 
DG projects.   
93
 See Itron, Inc., “CPUC Self-Generation Incentive 
Program: Cost Effectiveness of Distributed 
Generation Technologies” (2011), at 3-9, 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/2EB97E1C‐
348C‐4CC4‐A3A5‐ 
D417B4DDD58F/0/SGIP_CE_Report_Final.pdf 
94
 Id. at 3-26.   
support, depending upon their ability to 
achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction.    
The program administrators are the three 
investor owned utilities in California, plus 
the California Center for Sustainable 
Energy.  California Senate Bill 412 extended 
the SGIP from January 1, 2012 to January 1, 
2016. Additionally, Senate Bill 412 revised 
the SGIP, making eligibility for the program 
based on the potential for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions.    
The California SGIP is a California Public 
Utilities Commission program that 
incentivizes “clean, efficient, on-site 
distributed generation.”95   The generation 
system is installed on the customer side of 
the meter.96   Most of the participants are 
commercial or industrial, with some limited 
participation from residential, government 
and other sectors.97   
The 2011 SGIP budget was around $77 mm 
in total.  About 75% of the funding was 
allocated for renewable and emerging 
technologies, with the other 25% 
designated for non‐renewable 
technologies.98  Funds for the SGIP are 
acquired through fees charged to the 
ratepayers for each utility company.  As of 
December 31, 2010, a total of 441 projects 
                                                        
95
 California Public Utilities Commission, “Self 
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2011), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/. 
96
 Id.  
97
 See Itron, Inc., “CPUC Self-Generation Incentive 
Program: Cost Effectiveness of Distributed 
Generation Technologies,” supra.   
98
 Id. at 68.  
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had been completed under the SGIP, for a 
total capacity of 227 MW.99  
California Investor Owned Utilities benefit 
from the SGIP insofar as it helps them meet 
the California Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(33% of the electricity by the year 2020) 
and energy efficiency goals.   The incentive 
program also benefits the SGIP ratepayers 
through reduced electricity bills.  Overall, 
“payments to SGIP participants benefit all 
ratepayers by reducing the need for utilities 
to invest in expensive transmission and 
distribution infrastructure.”100  
The incentive levels for eligible DG 
technologies range from $1250/kW 
installed costs for wind, waste heat to 
power and pressure reduction turbines to 
$500/kW installed, for gas-fired CHP or 
micro-turbines.  Emerging technologies, 
such as energy storage and biogas enjoy a 
$2000/kW installed subsidy, and fuel cells 
$2,250/kW.101   Projects greater than 30 kW 
are paid half up front, and the other half 
over a five-year period, based upon 
performance.   The maximum incentive 
amount is $5 mm per project, never to 
exceed 60% of the project cost.102 
                                                        
99
 California Public Utilities Commission, “Self‐
Generation Incentive Program Statistics” (December 
19, 2011);  
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
SGIPstats_through12‐31‐ 08.htm  
100
 California Public Utilities Commission, “CPUC 
Regulatory Process and the SGIP,” (2007). URL: 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
pucregprocess.htm 
101
 California Public Utilities Commission, “Self 
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2011), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/.  
Solar energy has a separate program from the SGIP.  
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 Id. at 25-26.  See also 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=CA23F. 
Excess power produced can be exported to 
the grid.  However, the amount of energy 
exported to the grid is not to exceed 25% of 
the energy produced on‐site yearly.103 
When power is exported back to the 
electrical grid, customers receive net energy 
metering credits from only certain 
technologies, such as fuel cells and biogas‐
fueled systems.  As with Ohio, gas-fired CHP 
does not receive the “full retail rate” for 
power exported to the grid.104  
Ohio has no similar self-generation 
incentive program, although there are some 
similarities between Senate Bills 221/315 
and the California SGIP.   Ohio also allows 
net metering, for instance, for renewable 
generation and for waste heat recovery, but 
not for gas-fired combined heat and power.   
However subsidies of up to 60% and $5 mm 
per project would have a significant effect 
in enabling at DG in Ohio.   Certainly a 
$500/kW installed cost subsidy would be a 
major impetus for the adoption of smaller 
scale gas-fired combined heat and power 
projects. 
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 Id. at 31.   
104
 Itron, supra, at 3-11.   
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F. Regional Energy Planning 
 
Manufacturers interested in distributed 
generation might benefit from regional 
collaboration with local authorities and 
communities.  Distributed generation, 
especially CHP, will not be a “one size fits” 
all application; every situation requires an 
analysis specific to those circumstances.   
Planning can help manufacturers identify 
strategies to deploy CHP, including more 
access to less expensive “off the shelf “ 
technologies.    
 
In particular, for regions with a large variety 
of manufacturing and other electricity 
intensive users, a coordinated regional CHP 
program may be useful to new and existing 
manufacturers trying to find a fit for their 
power and heat needs.  Such a program 
might be set up to address three strategic 
areas: 
1. Commercial buildings and small 
industrial applications – deploying 
similar equipment and with similar 
financial goals and capabilities;  
2. Institutional facilities – with larger 
power and heat requirements, and 
with longer-term financing abilities, 
these facilities may be more 
amenable to ESCO savings and other 
finance structures; and  
3. Major industrial and district heating 
CHP's, where large-scale power is 
generated, visibility is high, and the 
returns to the districts and 
industries involved are potentially 
great. 
The development of an energy master plan 
could help manufacturers identify not only 
potential projects, but also potential project 
developers for on-site DG.   Such a master 
plan might begin with a Geographical 
Information System based “energy map” 
that is prepared at a neighborhood, local 
authority or sub-regional scale.  It might 
include an assessment of existing building 
energy demands as a baseline, identify 
likely locations for new business 
development and assess effects on energy 
demand.  It might also include a “heat 
map,” identifying anchor heat loads, such as 
large public buildings.105   
These energy maps could reveal CHP 
generated district heating opportunities 
that local authorities or project managers 
might be willing to support.  They may also 
inform growth options and serve as the 
starting point for energy planning for 
developers.   A decentralized energy master 
plan could include technical, planning, 
financial, and legal support – all better 
enabling manufacturers to evaluate DG 
opportunities.  
Local energy planning can provide a 
roadmap for manufacturing to identify 
strategies for developing on site DG 
opportunities.   Traditionally, with 
centralized generation, transactional costs 
have been a small percentage of the total 
project costs, and as such, do not threaten 
planning.   However transactional costs do 
not generally go down proportionally with 
the project size.  These costs can serve as 
an impediment to the development of DG.   
Manufacturers are generally unwilling to 
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 M. King and R. Shaw, “Community Energy:  
Planning, Development and Delivery,” at 7 (Ashford 
Colour Press 2011).   
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spend hundreds of thousands dollars 
identifying potential distributed generation 
projects, especially small projects below a 
few Megawatts.  Regional energy planning 
may help reduce these costs for 
manufacturers by identifying for them not 
only potential projects, but also potential 
collaborators and sources of funding.   
To date only a handful of regional energy 
plans have been developed in the United 
States.    These included studies conducted 
in San Diego106, Kane County (Illinois)107 and 
New Hampshire.108   All of these studies 
included a baseline investigation of energy 
production and projected needs for the 
region.  All included an action plan to 
address climate change and to increase 
local energy production while decreasing 
reliance on fossil fuel generation. All three 
also developed strategies for enabling 
distributed generation systems to increase 
local energy production.  
None, however, employed the energy 
mapping strategies that were developed for 
London, England in the aforementioned 
King study.  This sort of investigation will be 
required to enable manufacturing to 
identify opportunities to provide district 
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 San Diego Regional Energy Plan by San Diego 
Association of Governments in December 1994. 
Complete energy plan can be found at: 
http://energycenter.org/uploads/energy_plan.pdf.  
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 The full energy plan for Kane County is available 
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ciency%20and%20Conservation%20Block%20Grants
/Kane%20County%202040%20Energy%20Plan/KC20
40EP_5_20_2011_FULL.pdf.  
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 Rockingham Planning Commission (2008), 
Regional Master Plan: Energy Chapter. Full text 
found at: http://www.rpc-
lnh.org/PDFs/projects/energy/Energy%20Chapter%2
06-4-08.pdf 
heating through CHP projects.   The King 
study included a ten stage undertaking that 
included among other things, data 
gathering, project identification, financial 
modeling, and feasibility studies.109  This 
sort of information would be more useful in 
developing manufacturing’s appetite for 
undertaking DG.   
                                                        
109
 King, supra, at 14-35.   
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V.   Conclusions
Ohio today faces a considerable challenge 
in keeping its manufacturing base 
competitive.  Energy-intensive 
manufacturing, in particular, is threatened 
by rising electricity costs and a potential 
need to reduce carbon emissions.  
Electricity costs are scheduled to go up 
considerably, especially in northern Ohio, as 
a result of increased capacity charges and 
the retirement of old coal plants.  In 
addition to this, Ohio manufacturers are 
expected to incur significant capital 
investment costs in complying with new 
EPA guidelines for heat and steam 
generation.  Both of these trends indicate a 
need for manufacturing to consider 
distributed generation, especially combined 
heat and power systems, to improve 
efficiencies and to reduce costs and 
emissions.   The good news, however, is 
that the timing to do so could not be better:  
natural gas – the primary fuel for CHP 
systems – is currently inexpensive, and is 
likely to remain so for sometime as a result 
of the advent of shale development.  
According to the companion study 
undertaken with this investigation, an 
increase in the industrial electricity price by 
1 cent per kilowatt-hour decreases average 
manufacturing productivity by 2.2% per 
employee.  Northern Ohio will face PJM 
capacity charge increases comparable to 
this amount by 2016.  Continued price 
increases for electricity will likely have a 
material affect on Ohio manufacturing’s 
ability to compete in a global market.  The 
development of strategies to keep 
distribution and other charges from 
skyrocketing in the coming years will be 
critical.  Among the most promising of these 
strategies is the adoption of Combined Heat 
and Power technology. 
But investment by manufacturing into CHP 
or other DG systems will not be possible 
unless there is a regulatory framework in 
place that encourages the adoption of these 
systems. Current regulatory schemes in 
Ohio have taken some steps, such as Senate 
Bills 221 and 315, to encourage distributed 
generation and CHP.  However there remain 
significant obstacles to the adoption of CHP, 
such as high standby fees, that threaten the 
widespread adoption of that technology.  
It will require energy-intensive 
manufacturing to again take leadership in 
rethinking and reinventing our energy 
generation and distribution model, just as it 
did thirty years ago when it led America to 
deregulate its wholesale electricity markets.    
America’s next energy “quiet revolution” – 
the switch to distributed generation -- will 
be just as important to the American 
economy as was the deregulation of 
wholesale electricity markets.  This will be 
especially true for Ohio, where the 
economy is highly dependent upon energy-
intensive manufacturing.   Ohio’s electricity 
generation and distribution models for the 
next fifty years may very well depend upon 
the leadership shown by manufacturing in 
the coming years.   
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